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We investigate the relationship between real estate markets and bank distress among
German universal and specialized mortgage banks between 1995 and 2004. Higher
house prices increase the value of collateral, which reduces the probability of bank
distress (PDs). But higher prices at given rents may also indicate excessive expec-
tations regarding the present value of real estate assets, which can increase PDs.
Increasing price-to-rent ratios are positively related to PDs and larger real estate
exposures amplify this e￿ect. Rising real estate price levels alone reduce bank PDs,
but only for banks with large real estate market exposure. This suggests a positive,
but relatively small ’collateral’ e￿ect for banks with more expertise in specialized
mortgage lending. Likewise, lower price-to-rent ratios are estimated to reduce the
riskiness of banks. The multilevel logit model used here further shows that real
estate markets are regionally segmented and location-speci￿c e￿ects contribute sig-
ni￿cantly to predicted bank PDs.
Keywords: Real estate; distress; universal vs. specialized banks; multilevel mixed-
e￿ect model
JEL: C25; G21; G3Non-technical summary
The detrimental e￿ects of overheated real estate markets for ￿nancial stability
are obvious in light of the recent turmoil in international ￿nancial systems. But the
relation between real estate markets and bank distress is hardly analyzed for the
majority of economies that do not show clear signs of overheating, such as Germany.
The scarcity of empirical evidence on the relation between house prices and bank
distress relates to two measurement problems. First, comparable series on house
prices are often unavailable or mask important regional di￿erences that in￿uence
banking risks. Also, in addition to price levels, the ratio of rents generated from
real estate assets relative to their price may be a more adequate determinant of
bank risk. But corresponding data on both property prices and rents is usually
even more di￿cult to obtain. Second, bank distress is usually not announced to the
public. Failures are resolved within banking groups to reduce the risk of negative
externalities, which complicates the measurement of bank’s risk in most studies.
We address both issues by combining information on bank distress collected
by the Deutsche Bundesbank with regional house price information collected by a
private data provider, Bulwien AG. We suggest a novel multilevel hazard rate model
as to account more explicitly for the regional di￿erences of housing markets and the
respective location of banks in di￿erent states of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Within this framework, we provide empirical evidence on the relation between real
estate price developments and bank distress for a large bank-based economy.
Especially the regional aspect of house price developments has important impli-
cations for bank distress. Random region-speci￿c e￿ects contribute signi￿cantly to
the PD of banks. Approximately one third of predicted PDs of banks located in the
new federal states of Germany is due to this location e￿ect. In contrast, the location
contribution to PDs is relatively low and negative for banks headquartered in the
old federal states.
The level of real estate prices is of minor importance for bank distress, both sta-
tistically and economically. Price-to-rent ratios that indicate the extent to which
cash ￿ows are expected to be generated from property are in turn consistently
positively related to bank PDs. Akin to the price-earnings ratio from the ￿nance
literature, higher prices per Euro of expected rent generated from real estate as-
sets may therefore indicate deviations from fundamentals, thereby contributing to a
larger probability of banks to face distress. Note, however, that in contrast to price-
earnings ratios of liquid ￿nancial assets, property rents do not adjust very often.
This might limit the ability of our proxy to measure changes in the expectation of
the value of real estate assets in the future perfectly.Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Die gegenw￿rtigen Turbulenzen in internationalen Finanzsystemen unterstrei-
chen die negativen Auswirkungen ￿berhitzter Immobilienm￿rkte f￿r die Finanzsta-
bilit￿t entwickelter Volkswirtschaften. Viele Immobilienm￿rkte, z. B. in Deutschland,
weisen jedoch keine Anzeichen derartiger Blasen auf. Theoretisch sind Immobilien-
m￿rkte jedoch auch ohne o￿ensichtliche ￿berhitzung f￿r den Zustand des Bankwe-
sens relevant, da Kreditinstitute Hypothekenkredite vergeben und Immobilien als
Sicherheiten nutzen. Empirisch ist der Zusammenhang zwischen Immobilienm￿rk-
ten und Bankstabilit￿t jedoch weitgehend unerforscht.
Der Mangel an empirischer Evidenz ist vor allem auf Messprobleme von Haus-
preisen und der Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Schie￿age bei Banken (PD) zur￿ck zu
f￿hren. Vergleichbare Hauspreisindizes sind entweder nicht oder nur auf nationalem
Niveau vorhanden. Dies vernachl￿ssigt wichtige regionale Unterschiede von Immo-
bilienm￿rkten, welche f￿r die Stabilit￿t lokaler Banken relevant sind. Korrespondie-
rende Preis- und Mietzinsdaten sind ebenfalls selten vorhanden, was die Ermittlung
entsprechender Quotienten in Analogie zu Kurs-Gewinn-Verh￿ltnissen (KGV) an-
derer Finanzanlagen verhindert. Diese sind jedoch zur Einsch￿tzung von Bankrisiken
eher geeignet. Bankrisiken selbst sind ebenfalls nur selten akkurat zu ermitteln, weil
Schie￿agen meist innerhalb des Bankensystems gel￿st werden, um negative Exter-
nalit￿ten zu vermeiden.
In der vorliegenden Studie nutzen wir die Ausfalldatenbank der Bundesbank
und regional erhobene Immobilienmarktdaten des privaten Dienstleisters Bulwien
AG, um diese Probleme zu umgehen. Wir nutzen ein neues multilevel hazard model,
um regionale Unterschiede des Banken- und Immobilienmarktes in der empirischen
Sch￿tzung von Bank PDs explizit zu ber￿cksichtigen.
Unsere Ergebnisse best￿tigen die Wichtigkeit regionaler Immobilienmarktentwick-
lungen f￿r Bank PDs auch dann, wenn es keinerlei Anzeichen einer ￿berhitzung von
Immobilienm￿rkten gibt. Das hier genutzte empirische Modell sch￿tzt den Ein￿uss
regionaler E￿ekte auf Bank PDs separat. Diese E￿ekte sind sowohl statistisch als
auch ￿konomisch signi￿kant. Etwa ein Drittel der Bank PD von Instituten in den
neuen Bundesl￿ndern ist auf diesen regionalen E￿ekt zur￿ckzuf￿hren. Regionale PD
E￿ekte f￿r Banken mit Sitz in den alten Bundesl￿ndern sind hingegen negativ und
wesentlich kleiner.
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen auch, dass allein das Niveau von Immobilienpreisen
keinen wirtschaftlich signi￿kanten Ein￿uss auf Bank PDs hat. Im Gegensatz dazu
ist das Verh￿ltnis von Kaufpreisen zu Mietzinsen durchgehend signi￿kant positiv.
Insoweit dieser Quotient in Analogie zu KGVs die H￿he zu erwartender Ertr￿ge
aus dem Erwerb von Immobilien misst, deutet dieses Ergebnis darauf hin, dass
m￿glicherweise von Fundamentaldaten abweichende Erwartungen h￿here PDs nach
sich ziehen. Im Gegensatz zu KGVs gehandelter Finanzanlagen ist allerdings zu
bemerken, dass Mietzinsen sich nicht h￿u￿g ￿ndern sondern oftmals nur dann, wenn
es zu einem Mieterwechsel kommt. M￿glicherweise schr￿nkt dies die F￿higkeit der
Variable ein, die tats￿chlichen Anpassung von Erwartungen des zuk￿nftigen Wertes
von Immobilien perfekt zu messen.Contents
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1 Introduction
Recent turbulence in international ￿nancial systems originating from mortgage mar-
kets highlights the close relationship between real estate price developments and the
soundness of the ￿nancial sector. Real estate market problems are likely to precede
￿nancial crises as shown from a theoretical angle in Allen and Gale (2000) and as
con￿rmed by historical crises.2 Therefore, it is not surprising that policy makers also
consider property prices among other indicators in their ￿nancial sector assessment
programs (IMF, 2003).
Most studies on the relation between house prices and ￿nancial system sound-
ness share two characteristics. First, they often focus on economies with overheated
housing markets. But the vast majority of economies does not exhibit clear signs of
real estate prices deviating excessively far from fundamentals. Allen and Gale (2000)
show that ￿nancial stability can generally be impaired if (mortgage) credit expansion
in￿ates (real estate) asset prices, leaving leveraged investors crippled when prices de-
cline after having departed too far from fundamental levels. Real estate markets are
particularly prone to such deviations since supply is ￿xed in the short run and the
ability of banks to verify the riskiness of borrowers’ investments is imperfect. Often
it is only possible with hindsight to determine, which deviations from fundamen-
tals constitute a bubble. Therefore, it is surprising that only few studies investigate
the relation between bank distress and real estate markets when the latter are not
obviously overheated.
Second, most studies take a macro perspective and focus on mortgage loan supply
(dynamics) following monetary shocks (Bernanke et al., 1994; Kiyotaki and Moore,
1997; Aoki et al., 2004).3 But ￿nancial stability implications of real estate devel-
opments might apply in particular to more granular micro and regional levels of
the banking system. For example, Case et al. (2000) acknowledge the importance
of macroeconomic conditions for delinquencies and defaults in general. But they
emphasize the crucial importance of banks’ abilities to score mortgage customers
to explain most of the variability of distress when there is no turbulence in hous-
ing markets. Related, Calomiris and Mason (2003) study the Great Depression in
the U.S. at the individual bank level and ￿nd that distress is triggered partially
by fundamentals and partially by panics. In line with Case and Shiller (1996), they
emphasize the importance of avoiding the aggregation of fundamentals, which might
camou￿age critical regional or sectoral shocks.
1M.Koetter@rug.nl (M. Koetter) and T.Poghosyan@rug.nl (T. Poghosyan). The opinions expressed in this paper
are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Deutsche Bundesbank. We are grateful to Heinz Herrmann
and Thilo Liebig for both hospitality as well as feedback and thank the Bundesbank for the provision of data.
We also acknowledge helpful comments from Jaap Bos, Clemens Kool, Iman van Lelyveld, Michael Wedow and
participants of the NAKE conference 2007 and the Bundesbank research seminar. This paper is part of a research
project sponsored by the foundation ’Geld und W￿hrung’. Michael Koetter gratefully acknowledges support from
the Netherland’s Organization for Scienti￿c Research NWO.
2For example, in the U.S. (late 1980’s), Scandinavia (late 1980’s), Mexico (early 1980’s), Japan
(early 1990’s), and Southeast Asia (1998) (Hilbers et al., 2001; BIS and IMF, 2002).
3This ’￿nancial accelerator’ literature focuses on the implications for the propagation of mone-
tary policy. See also Borio et al. (1994) and Higgins and Osler (1999).
1We provide empirical evidence on the relation between bank distress and housing
prices when real estate markets are not in exceptional circumstances. We measure
bank distress at the individual ￿rm level and account explicitly for local hetero-
geneity across real estate markets to which banks are exposed. Both issues appear
to constitute hurdles in the existing literature due to two di￿culties. The ￿rst re-
lates to the valuation of real estate assets taking into account regional di￿erences.
These assets are heterogenous and therefore it remains unclear to what extent price
levels re￿ect deviations from fundamentals (BIS and IMF, 2002). Clayton (1996),
McCarthy and Peach (2004) and Ayuso and Restoy (2006) suggest to use instead
house price-to-rent ratios. Similar to price-earnings ratios in the ￿nance literature,
they re￿ect expectations on cash ￿ows to be generated from holding real estate
assets. This ratio is better suited to indicate deviations from fundamentals if ex-
pectations are excessive, however, corresponding price and rent data for comparable
assets is usually absent. We use annual information on real estate prices and rents
in 125 German cities consistently collected by the data provider Bulwien AG. Price
developments are di￿erent across Germany’s regions due to structural disparity in
economic activity and most likely may in￿uence bank distress di￿erently. We con-
struct both price levels and price-to-rent ratios at the German state level, thereby
taking into account regional di￿erences.
The second challenge most studies face concerns the measurement of bank dis-
tress. Usually, information on bank distress is not publicly available. We have access
to the bank distress database assembled by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Therefore, we
can directly estimate probabilities of distress (PD) conditional on bank’s exposure
to the real estate market and other bank traits. Banks with larger exposures may be
more experienced in real estate lending and possess therefore superior screening and
monitoring skills in this business segment that reduce their PD. In turn, an explicit
focus on this line of business might imply low risk diversi￿cation and could thus
result in systematically higher PDs. We are able to test these competing hypotheses
explicitly in this paper.
Methodologically, we aim to advance beyond previous bank hazard studies of
thrifts and mortgage banks (Harrison and Ragas, 1995; Guo, 1999; Gan, 2004) by
applying a multilevel mixed-e￿ect discrete choice model to identify the impact of
regional housing price developments on the riskiness of German banks. Instead of
merely including macroeconomic conditions as controls in the hazard estimation
(Nuxoll et al., 2003), we specify random region-speci￿c e￿ects. This allows us to
dissect the contributing factors to predicted bank-speci￿c PDs into a random re-
gional component exogenous to bankers and a part attributable to bank-speci￿c
characteristics.
Our results con￿rm that real estate markets a￿ect bank distress. In particular
price-to-rent ratios signi￿cantly increase bank PDs. House price measures are signif-
icantly independent of other regional macroeconomic characteristics. The random
contribution to bank distress due to location in the new federal states is positive,
while it is negative for banks located in the old states. Larger exposures to mort-
gage lending amplify both positive price-to-rent ratio and negative price level e￿ects.
Negative price level coe￿cients indicate a ’collateral’ e￿ect. But substantially larger
magnitudes of positive price-to-rent ratio coe￿cients highlight the relative impor-
tance of this indicator to assess bank stability.
2The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We review existing theo-
retical and empirical literature on the relationship between real estate prices and
the soundness of the ￿nancial sector in section 2. Section 3 outlines our empirical
methodology, a multilevel mixed-e￿ect binary choice model, and describes the data.
We discuss estimation and robustness checks in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Real estate prices and bank distress
2.1 Real estate prices
In a frictionless world, real estate can be priced just as any other asset by discount-
ing expected cash ￿ows generated from rental payments. Cash ￿ows are in￿uenced
by demand and supply of real estate assets, which in turn depend on macroeconomic
fundamentals, such as population growth, real income and wealth, and interest rates.
Real estate prices would then re￿ect economic cycles (Higgins and Osler, 1999). But
this relationship is unlikely to hold perfectly for three reasons. First, real estate con-
cerns non-standardized assets that di￿er considerably regarding quality and that
are by de￿nition regionally segmented. Second, the absence of central trading places
implies that real estate prices are not generated with perfect information. Conse-
quently, trading usually involves price negotiations that are characterized by a lack
of transparency and high transaction costs. As a result, real estate markets are less
liquid compared to ￿nancial markets. Third, relatively long construction lags of real
estate hinder the match of demand and supply for real estate (McCarthy and Peach,
2004). Due to these particularities, real estate prices are prone to deviate from their
fundamental values, which implies the potential to cause turmoil in ￿nancial sys-
tems. Hilbers et al. (2001) survey a number of studies that theorize on the mechanics
of such bubbles, which are primarily driven by a combination of constrained real es-
tate supply in the short run, lenders’ limited ability to assess project risks, and
herding behavior of investors (Allen and Gale, 2000).
Empirical work on the relation between real estate prices and banking stability is
plagued by a number of factors that relate to measurement problems of the former.
Hilbers et al. (2001) use a probit model to estimate the likelihood of a ￿nancial crises
as de￿ned in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) conditional on country characteristics
and the real residential property price index. They report a positive relation between
housing prices and crises for only two countries. Partly, this may re￿ect measurement
problems of property prices that hamper international comparisons due to di￿erences
across countries in terms of real estate ￿nancing schemes, tax laws, or regulation
regarding the use of real estate as a collateral. Alternatively, some studies argue that
property price levels contain only limited information regarding deviations from the
fundamental value. Ayuso and Restoy (2006) present a model of (dis-)equilibria in
real estate markets emphasizing the role of real estate price-to-rent ratios. High
ratios indicate high, potentially too high, expectations of investors regarding the
possible cash ￿ows to generate from the asset, i.e. rents and terminal value. In a
competitive market, homeowners will then sell property and rent instead. Higher
supply of property will reduce prices while increasing demand for leased space will
increase rents, thereby reducing price-to-rent ratios. However, if expectations on
either cash ￿ows or terminal values are exuberant, this will entail higher price-to-rent
3ratios, which therefore serve as better indicators of overheating compared to levels
alone (McCarthy and Peach, 2004). 4 Ayuso and Restoy (2006) report overvalued real
estate markets in Spain and the UK on the order of 20 and 30 percent, respectively. In
contrast to McCarthy and Peach (2004), who conclude on the basis of a price-to-rent
model for the U.S. that real estate markets were not overheated, Ayuso and Restoy
(2006) report that U.S. property was also overvalued by 10 percent. Note, that we
do not investigate in this paper if German real estate markets are in equilibrium or
not. Instead, we want to test if house prices in￿uence bank distress even if there are
no obvious signs of a real estate bubble. To this end, the previous literature shows
that price-to-rent ratios, whether in equilibrium or not, most likely contain more
relevant information to predict bank distress than prices per se.
The deviating ￿ndings of Ayuso and Restoy (2006) and McCarthy and Peach
(2004) with respect to the valuation of real estate markets may be due to the ne-
glect of accounting explicitly for regional di￿erences of property prices. As shown in
Calomiris and Mason (2003), this is crucial to explain the ￿nancial crisis in the U.S.
in the 1930s. More recently, Holly et al. (2007) developed a spatio-temporal model
of housing prices for the U.S. and report ￿ndings that corroborate the importance to
account for regional di￿erences. They demonstrate that after accounting for spatial
e￿ects, four U.S. states su￿ered from overvalued property markets.
Regional di￿erences are relevant for the German economy, too. Figure 3 in the
appendix depicts both the level of house prices and the corresponding price-to-rent
ratio for each of the 16 states (’Bundesl￿nder’ ) between 1995 and 2004. It shows
that, on average, real estate price levels have declined in Germany. Especially in the
new states both price levels and price-to-rent ratios have deteriorated substantially,
for example by approximately one third in Saxony. To some extent this price dete-
rioration may re￿ect a substantial increase in supply of real estate in the new states
due to favorable depreciation rules and tax breaks provided to investors renovating
existing or constructing new property. Another reason is related to weak demand.
While population growth in old federal states was 1.7 percent between 1995 and
2005, the population in the new states shrank by 5.5 percent. Note again that we
do neither intend to estimate equilibrium real estate prices, nor do we argue that
declining real estate prices indicate a return to fundamentals. Instead, the present
sample allows us to analyze the relation between bank distress in an environment of
constantly deteriorating real estate values. Evidence on the ability of banks to cope
with declining prices therefore complements studies investigating bank stability in
times of soaring real estate prices. Our sample permits analysis of the relevance of re-
gional real estate markets for bank distress while avoiding well-known measurement
problems related to both measures.
4Clearly, the determination of equilibria in real estate markets is a subject in it’s own right,
which is beyond the scope of our paper. In fact, the described characteristics of real estate imply
complex feedback dynamics between the supply of mortgage credit and houses as well as respective
demand schedules. Here, we focus on the prediction of bank PDs rather than the determination
of house prices and consider house prices as given based on the rejection of bivariate causality
between house prices and bank credit in Hofmann (2004).
42.2 Exposure and distress
The at times sharp downturn in real estate prices in Germany’s states may a￿ect
banks both directly through the decline of collateral value and indirectly through
deteriorating ￿nancial positions of bank clients, for example households. Intuitively,
a larger exposure of a bank to the real estate sector renders it more likely to be
a￿ected by real estate market ￿uctuations. The exposure of banks to the real es-
tate sector can take many di￿erent forms (Hilbers et al., 2001), such as lending to
customers for real estate purchases (often collateralized), or lending to non-bank
intermediaries that engage in real estate lending.
Such links are obvious for specialized mortgage banks. Empirical studies therefore
often focus on the performance and soundness of specialized intermediaries such as
thrifts (Guo, 1999; Gan, 2004), savings and loan associations (Harrison and Ragas,
1995), or building societies and cooperatives (Haynes and Thompson, 1999). How-
ever, Davis and Zhu (2005) point out that non-specialized banks are also exposed
to ￿uctuations in the real estate market. Many credit lines extended to the various
sectors of the economy (e.g. manufacturing) are based on a real estate collateral, for
example commercial property owned by the borrower. 5 Therefore, not only ￿nancial
institutions specialized in mortgage lending are potentially in￿uenced by negative
trends in the real estate market but also universal banks.
Previous studies on German bank distress do not consider specialized mortgage
banks (Kick and Koetter, 2007) and failure studies on specialized banks elsewhere do
not explicitly investigate the relation with regional real estate prices. 6 But account-
ing for both specialized and universal banks is particularly relevant in Germany’s
banking system (Hackethal, 2004). Universal banks are not restricted in their scope
of business activities and thus also engage in real estate lending. On average, the
share of mortgage loans of all credit extended for ￿ve or more years by universal
banks was 38 percent compared to 89 percent among specialized banks during 1995
and 2004 (see Table 1).
Table 1: Number of banks, distress events and exposure to housing loan market
Number of banks Distress events Housing loan
New states Old states Total (number) share (%)
Universal banks 310 3,186 3,496 1,570 38.3
Commerical 15 250 265 185 16.4
Savings 110 537 647 140 47.7
Credit cooperative 185 2,399 2,584 1,245 36.9
Specialized mortgage banks 4 71 75 47 89.0
Total 314 3,257 3,571 1,617 47.5
Note: New states are former states of the German Democratic Republic that joined the Federal
Republic of Germany in 1990.
At the same time, Figure 1 underpins the importance of specialized banks in
Germany’s ￿nancial system. While only 75 out of a total of 3,571 banks in our
5Real estate markets can also in￿uence the stability of banks via asset backed securities (ABS) in
the trading book. This creates a link between property values and distress of ￿nancial institutions
that are not directly exposed to mortgage lending. While we control in the hazard estimation for
securities hold by banks, data to identify separate investments in ABS is not available.
6Nuxoll et al. (2003) speci￿es only regional macroeconomic variables as a catch-all control.
5sample are classi￿ed by the Bundesbank as specialized mortgage banks, their share
of total assets vividly illustrates the importance of these intermediaries. Given the
historical deterioration of property prices, we hypothesize that increasing real estate
price levels reduce bank PDs since they increase the value of collateral and enhance
household wealth. However, Hilbers et al. (2001) emphasizes that the appropriate
assessment of the present value of real estate projects is notoriously di￿cult. Given
that previous studies argue that rising price-to-rent ratios are indicative of increasing
risks due to departures from fundamental values, we hypothesize in turn that price-
to-rent ratios are positively related to bank PDs.






















































1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 19921993 19941995 19961997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 20042005 20062007
Source:  Deutsche Bundesbank
Commercials Savings
Cooperatives Mortgage
Our second hypothesis relates to the inherent regional nature of both real estate
and banking markets. Most banks engage in local lending relations and therefore
we assign banks to regions based on the location of their headquarters. 7 We thus
evaluate the impact of housing price developments at the local level on the PDs of
individual banks. We separate the impact of developments in the housing market
from the aggregate, random impact of other state-speci￿c factors and test for it’s
signi￿cance to predict PDs.
Third, we hypothesize that intermediaries concentrating in mortgage lending
develop expertise and possess superior skills to assess the real estate values and
risks. We test below if the e￿ect of house prices on bank distress di￿ers signi￿cantly
between banks with and without large exposures to real estate lending.
7While realistic for the vast majority of commercial, cooperative, and savings banks, which
operate locally, this assumption may not hold for large commercial banks. We test below if results
remain qualitatively unchanged when excluding the latter.
63 Methodology
3.1 Empirical model
To estimate the probability of bank distress (PD), most studies employ a logistic






= α + βXijt + ηD (1)
where PDijt = Prob(Yijt = 1|Xijt,D) is the probability that the bank i located in
state j will encounter a distress event at time t conditional on the set of explanatory
variables, Xijt is a vector of bank-speci￿c explanatory variables, 9 D represents a
vector of time and banking group dummy variables, and α, β and η are parameters
to estimate. The intercept parameter α in equation (1) controls for the logarithm
of the probability ratio if all explanatory variables Xijt are simultaneously equal to
zero.10 An important assumption in this model is that the intercept parameter is
constant for all banks. This re￿ects the so-called independence of irrelevant alter-
natives (IIA) property of the simple logit model. It entails that odd ratios remain
constant regardless of the number of possible events analyzed.
Here, we estimate the relationship between housing prices at the German state
level and the riskiness of individual banks. This implies a multilevel hierarchy clus-
tering: banks are nested within states, for which we have aggregate information on
housing prices. Consequently, the standard IIA across subjects is likely to be violated
within the clusters. Ignoring this inter-cluster dependence diminishes the variance of
estimated parameters and overstates their signi￿cance (Hox, 2002). In addition, the
interdependence gives raise to the so-called spatial autocorrelation problem. This
problem is more severe than time series autocorrelation since not only the standard
errors of the parameters are biased in the presence of spatial autocorrelation, but
parameter estimates are also inconsistent.
To account appropriately for state-speci￿c e￿ects, we employ a multilevel mixed-
e￿ect binary choice model.11 The existence of spatial clusters provides additional
information on economic processes operating at di￿erent hierarchical levels. The
multilevel method extends the conventional econometric techniques to handle such
a dependence and exploits the information about economic relationships at di￿erent
levels. In our setup, we measure how large the state-level variation across bank
distress events is in comparison to the bank-level variation. Thereby, we can assess
which part of the state-level variation can be explained by the variation of housing
prices across German states and how it relates to the exposure of banks to the
8Kick and Koetter (2007) test various limited dependent variable models to estimate PDs.
9We use ￿nancial accounts data to construct CAMEL measures (C-capital adequacy, A-asset
quality, M-managerial quality, E-earnings, and L-liquidity), which we discuss below.
10Since CAMEL indicators are di￿erent from zero, we take the di￿erence of Xijt from sample
means before estimating the model(s). Slope coe￿cients β remain una￿ected, but the intercept α
represents the baseline hazard indicating the PD for a bank with an average CAMEL pro￿le.
11These models are frequently used when the micro data is clustered, for example students nested
in schools, employees in ￿rms, or cities in states (see Hox, 2002 for a textbook exposition and Guo
and Zhao, 2000 for a survey of applications in the various ￿elds of social science).
7mortgage business. To relax the restrictive assumptions present in equation (1), we






= αj + βXijt + ηD (2a)
αj = α + uj (2b)
This is a random e￿ect logistic model in which the intercept parameter for the in-
dividual bank is α + uj, where uj ∼ N(0,σ2
u). The random intercept uj represents
the combined e￿ect of all omitted state-speci￿c time-constant covariates that cause
the banks located in that particular state to be more or less prone to distress than
predicted by the mean probability of distress for the whole sample ( α). The random
e￿ect model is an example of a broader class of generalized linear mixed e￿ect mod-
els.12 The variation of the intercept at the state-level can be modeled as a function






= αj + βXijt + ηD (3a)
αj = α + λZj + uj (3b)
In this speci￿cation, the impact of state-speci￿c factors Zj is measured by the pa-
rameter λ and can be interpreted as systematic e￿ects in￿uencing the baseline bank
hazard at the state-level. In our setup, the state-speci￿c factor is the housing price
measure for individual German states.
It is important to notice the di￿erence between the speci￿cation where housing
price variables are speci￿ed as additional explanatory variables on the right hand
side of the simple logit speci￿cation and the random e￿ect formulation (3a-3b). The
later introduces more ￿exibility by assuming state-speci￿c random heterogeneity,
i.e. state-speci￿c factors apart from housing price changes that might be impor-
tant in predicting distress probabilities. The reduced form of the structural general






= α + βXijt−1 + ηD + λ1HPjt−1 + λ2HPRjt−1 + (4)
+ λ3HPjt−1SHijt−1 + λ4HPRjt−1SHijt−1 + uj
where SH is the percentage share of real estate loans in the bank’s total long-
term loans, HP and HPR are the logarithms of housing prices and price-to-rent
ratios (the state-speci￿c factors), respectively. 13 Speci￿cation (4) allows us to test the
competing hypotheses outlined in section 2. First, the coe￿cients λ1 and λ2 measure
the relative impact of housing price levels and price-to-rent ratios, respectively, on
bank PDs. Second, the random state e￿ect uj and its variance σ2
u allow us to compare
this model to the traditional, simple logit speci￿cations and, hence, to evaluate the
importance of accounting for state-speci￿c in￿uences on bank risk. Third, interaction
terms with bank’s exposure to the housing market SH allow us to test whether
the impact of the two housing price indicators changes with the degree of bank
involvement into the real estate market. The coe￿cients λ3 and λ4 show the impact
of housing prices and price-to-rent ratios on the likelihood of bank distress due to a
percentage point increase of its exposure to the real estate loans market.
12These are called mixed e￿ects models since they contain both ￿xed ( β) and random (αj) e￿ects.
13We describe all data in the next subsection.
83.2 Data
We combine three di￿erent databases to evaluate the impact of housing price ￿uc-
tuations on the riskiness of German banks: ￿nancial accounts, a distress database,
and a commercially provided set on real estate prices for 125 German cities.
Financial accounts We use Bundesbank data on banks balance sheets, income
statements, the credit register (’Kreditnehmerstatistik’ ), and audit reports for the
1994-2005 period. To specify ￿nancial covariates Xijt to predict bank distress we
follow the convention in the bank hazard literature and select proxies for banks’
capitalization, asset quality, management skills, earnings, and liquidity (CAMEL)
to predict bank PDs. Since the potential number of proxies is very large and lacks
speci￿c theoretical priors, we use a selection technique suggested by Hosmer and
Lemshow (2000). We generate a list of around 150 potential CAMEL covariate
candidates. Based on individual explanatory power, we select around 50 covariates
that are tested with stepwise logistic regressions within each CAMEL category.
Stepwise regression and economic signi￿cance result in the ￿nal vector of CAMEL
covariates. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics.
Table 2: Mean values for CAMEL covariates
Distress
CAMEL covariate No Yes Total Di￿erence
Reserves c1 2.22 2.36 2.23 0.14∗∗
Equity ratio c2 5.48 5.00 5.45 -0.48∗∗∗
Risky loans a1 20.77 29.64 21.30 8.87∗∗∗
OBS activities a2 9.92 11.22 9.99 1.30∗∗∗
Customer loans a3 58.90 58.93 58.91 -0.02
Cost e￿ciency m1 93.71 90.72 93.53 -2.99∗∗∗
Return on assets e1 14.17 -3.55 13.12 -17.72∗∗∗
Liquidity l1 6.70 8.10 6.78 1.40∗∗∗
Number of obs. 24,524 1,554 26,078
Note: All variables are in percentage terms. The sample contains 3,496 universal and
75 specialized banks. ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate signi￿cance at the 5 and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
The resulting sample is an unbalanced panel containing 26,078 observations on
3,496 universal and 75 specialized German banks for the 1995-2004 period. 14 Both
capitalization measures should reduce the likelihood of bank distress. The next three
variables capture bank asset quality, including o￿-balance sheet activities. The larger
the value of these indicators, the lower is the asset quality of a bank. We expect a
positive coe￿cient for these covariates. The management quality variable is approx-
imated by the level of bank-speci￿c cost e￿ciency obtained using stochastic frontier
analysis (SFA) (see also Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Koetter et al., 2007). Given the
heterogeneous sample of banks (commercial, savings, cooperative and specialized)
with di￿erent types of technological frontiers, we measure the cost e￿ciency using
the latent class frontier approach. 15 This approach remains agnostic as to which
14Due to missing observations regarding CAMEL covariates and using one year lags in the hazard
estimation, the number of observations decreased to 22,419 observations.
15See Bos et al. (2008) for the importance to account for heterogeneity and Koetter and
Poghosyan (2008) for further details on the latent class frontier model.
9banks are allocated to which technology regime. Rather than choosing a priori an
ultimately arbitrary allocation, we condition group membership probabilities on the
bank’s mortgage loan share and an indicator variable capturing classi￿cation ac-
cording to the Bundesbank. The appendix provides technical details of the latent
class stochastic e￿ciency frontier model used to obtain the bank-speci￿c e￿ciency
scores. We expect a negative coe￿cient in front of this variable, since banks with
better managerial skills and expertise are expected to be less prone to distress. The
last two variables measure earnings and liquidity of banks. Stronger earnings should
decrease distress probabilities. The impact of liquidity is ambiguous. More liquidity
might mean that banks have more free resources at their disposal to alleviate dis-
tress. Alternatively, it may imply an ine￿cient allocation of resources to low-yield
assets that contributes to the distress.
Distressed events CAMEL covariates are speci￿ed in the hazard rate model to
estimate bank-speci￿c PDs. In contrast to most failure studies, we use data assem-
bled by the Bundesbank recording distressed events among German universal and
specialized banks between 1995 and 2004 (see Table 1). Distressed events are de￿ned
pursuant to the credit act and guidelines issued by the Federal Financial Supervi-
sory Authority (BaFin). The data comprise obligatory noti￿cations from banks in
line with the credit act, compulsory noti￿cations about losses amounting to 25 per-
cent of the liable capital, a decline of operational pro￿ts by more than 25 percent,
or more direct measures forwarded by the BaFin, for example o￿cial warnings to
the bank CEO, orders to restructure operations, restrictions to lending and deposit
taking, dismissal of the bank CEO as well as bank takeovers and enforced closures.
The regional dispersion of bank distress is high and represents an important aspect
that must not be discarded neither regarding real estate price developments nor
regarding distressed events.16 We suspect that a considerable part of bank PDs is
attributable to region-speci￿c e￿ects, which the bank can hardly in￿uence in the
short run. Speci￿cally, the development of housing prices discussed next and the
well-known persistence of structural de￿ciencies lead us to expect that individual
bank PDs are positively in￿uenced by a bank’s location in one of the new states.
Real estate Real estate prices and rents are obtained from the data provider
Bulwien AG. The dataset contains annual information on housing prices and rents
for 125 German cities for the 1995-2004 period. 17 We use city-level information on
existing house prices and rents to generate aggregate state-level indices. 18 ANOVA
estimations shown in the appendix corroborate the idea of aggregation since we
￿nd that state-level housing price variation is relatively large in comparison to the
city-level variation within the states. 19 The evolution of the state-level price and rent
indices is shown in Figure 3 in the appendix. House price levels decline continuously,
but both levels and dynamics di￿er across states. A similar picture emerges from the
descriptive statistics for price-to-rent ratios. Note, however, that some states, such
16Distress frequencies per state and year in addition to Table 1 are available upon request.
17Note that rents do not change frequently, mostly when tenants change. Therefore, rental prices
may not fully re￿ect faster and more frequent expectation changes of future real estate prices. To
some extent this concern is mitigated by the fact that rental prices per city are averages, thus
covering a sample also including vacated, and hence rent-adjusted, premises in a given year.
18We also use data on new house prices and rents for robustness checks. The latter usually
exclude energy cost, which di￿er at times across regions, too.
19City-speci￿c e￿ects in equation (4) are infeasible since banks also operate outside the cities
where they are headquartered. Furthermore, this would neglect most banks in the industry.
10as Bremen, Baden-Wurttemberg, or Hesse, exhibit price-to-rent ratios that increased
prior to 2000. Hence, this measure seems to contain additional information.
4 Results
4.1 Speci￿cation
Our empirical estimation strategy is to start from the simplest multilevel mixed-
e￿ect logistic speci￿cation, which we label Model 0, and to augment it incrementally
to more general models and test their validity using likelihood ratio (LR) tests and
the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
Table 3: Multilevel mixed-e￿ect logit model speci￿cations
Model0 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
State e￿ect (uj) × × × × ×
HP × × ×
HPR × × ×
HP*SH ×
HPR*SH ×
Log-likelihood -4,382 -4,381 -4,374 -4,373 -4,366
AIC 8,806 8,807 8,791 8,792 8,782
LR test (p-value)
Simple logit 0.0000 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Model0 ￿ 0.3571 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Model1 ￿ ￿ N/A 0.0000 0.0000
Model2 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.3380 0.0000
Model3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.0000
Note: 22,419 observations. Time- and group-speci￿c e￿ects included. × indicates the variables in-
cluded in each of the speci￿cations. LR test is not applicable for Models 1 and 2. Lower Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) indicate preference for Model 2.
Table 3 displays model speci￿cations and according test results for the set of
models under consideration. First of all, the comparison of the simplest multilevel
mixed-e￿ect logistic speci￿cation Model 0 to an ordinary logistic model employed
in previous studies provides unambiguous support for the multilevel speci￿cation.
This ￿nding corroborates our prior that, even after controlling for the impact of
bank-speci￿c CAMEL covariates, there still remains a substantial state-level random
variation of bank distress. This variation might be related to various state-speci￿c
characteristics, which would be neglected if we were to follow the conventional stream
of the literature by modeling bank distress using a simple logistic speci￿cation. Our
objective now is to explore the extent to which the state-speci￿c heterogeneity can
be described by regional developments in the real estate market.
Second, including house price levels alone in Model 1 does not improve the model
￿t as indicated by the LR test. In contrast, the speci￿cation of price-to-rent ratios in
Model 2 is supported on grounds of both the LR test and the information criterion
(AIC). While Models 1 and 2 are not nested, thus prohibiting the former test, the
11lower AIC for Model 2 supports the importance of price-to-rent ratios. This suggests
that especially this proxy for deviations from the fundamentals is of importance for
bank distress. This is corroborated by a comparison of the speci￿cation with both
ratios and levels (Model 3) to a speci￿cation including only the former (Model 2).
The relative power of the former model does not improve signi￿cantly relative to
Model 2 and the LR test con￿rms the lack of the signi￿cant improvement. This
￿nding implies that the level of real estate price indices alone contributes only little
to explain the state-speci￿c random variation in PDs, as opposed to the price-to-rent
ratios.
The most general speci￿cation of equation (4) interacts both housing price indi-
cators with the banks’ share of mortgage loans in long term lending (Model 4). This
speci￿cation outperforms all previous models in terms of ￿t as indicated by both
the LR test statistics and the AIC. Hence, housing prices in levels appear to add to
the information on bank distress of those intermediaries, which are involved more
actively in real estate lending. Therefore, we use Model 4 as a reference speci￿cation
in our further discussion.
4.2 Estimations
The multilevel mixed-e￿ect logit estimation results for the reference speci￿cation
Model 4 are displayed in the ￿rst column of Table 4. The CAMEL covariates are
signi￿cant and exhibit the expected signs. In line with the previous evidence, greater
capitalization, higher managerial quality and earnings decrease individual bank PDs.
Inferior asset quality and accumulation of low-yield liquidity, in turn, increase the
hazard of bank distress.
Consider ￿rst the relation between distress and price-to-rent ratios. The coe￿-
cient λ2 is signi￿cant and positive, suggesting that larger acquisition costs of real
estate per square meter relative to the rent extractable from these assets increase
the riskiness of banks. To some extent, this result is in line with the ’disaster my-
opia’ hypothesis advanced in Herring and Wachter (1999). Disaster myopia entails
in general that risks might be systematically underestimated if sudden corrections
occur only infrequently. Intuitively, the likelihood of sudden correction is increasing
with higher deviation from fundamentals. The latter is the result of the willingness
of investors to pay more per square meter of real estate, since these investors expect
higher returns from either rents or asset values in the future. While price levels in
general are low in Germany, these expectations might still indicate at any given
point in time overly optimistic expectations that banks are willing to ￿nance.
Related to our third hypothesis on exposure, this impact is signi￿cantly more
pronounced for banks largely involved into real estate lending. The positive addi-
tional e￿ect on PDs of banks with relatively larger exposures ( λ4) then suggests that
especially the risk of these intermediaries increases if expectations of returns from
real estate investments are too high. Put di￿erently, large existing mortgage loan
exposures interacted with rising, perhaps unfounded, expectations increase bank
PDs, potentially re￿ecting a systematic underestimation of real estate market risks.
Since price-to-rent ratios have consistently declined since 1997 in (almost) all states,
the estimated positive coe￿cients for λ2 and λ4 indicate that declining expectations














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14Consider next the impact of house price levels on bank PDs. We ￿nd no signi￿cant
impact of housing prices per se on the PD of banks that are not involved in real
estate lending (insigni￿cant λ1). However, the impact is signi￿cantly negative for
banks extending some part of their loans to this market (negative and signi￿cant
λ3). The negative impact of housing prices increases for this set of banks and can
be explained by an increase in the values of the real estate collateral these banks
hold. Therefore, even if the customers are unable to repay their debt, the bank will
be able to compensate the losses by liquidating the collateral at a higher price. This
is in line with a ’collateral channel’ of housing price transmission to balance sheet
positions of banks and their clients, which is also documented to propagate credit
cycles through the ￿nancial accelerator mechanism (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
Finally, note that our hypothesis of the relevance of accounting more explicitly
for the regional nature of real estate markets is supported throughout. Estimates of
the intercept α, which can be interpreted as a baseline hazard rate, are signi￿cant
at the one percent level.20 The signi￿cant variation of the state-speci￿c random part
in the overall intercept, denoted by σ2
u, supports the hypothesis that bank distress
is a￿ected by its location even after netting out the impact of regional real estate
price developments.
4.3 Robustness
We investigate the implications of some important assumptions we made with re-
spect to the validity of our previous conclusions. First, in evaluating the impact
of state-speci￿c housing price variables on the distress of banks operating in those
states, we implicitly assume that banks are active in the states where their headquar-
ter is located. While realistic for the majority of German banks, this assumption is
too restrictive for large banks, which conduct their operations all over the Republic
and also abroad. Therefore, we re-estimate our model after excluding large com-
mercial, savings, and cooperative banks from the sample. As shown in Table 4, the
qualitative results of the preferred speci￿cation regarding the impact of real estate
price proxies remain unchanged.
Next, by pooling universal and specialized German banks in our estimations, we
assume that banks belonging to di￿erent banking groups respond in a similar way
to housing market ￿uctuations. Accounting for possible group di￿erences only by
means of dummy variables might be too restrictive, especially when considering spe-
cialized mortgage banks. Their primary business is real estate lending and they might
therefore be more experienced in hedging against housing market risks. Therefore,
we exclude specialized banks from the sample as another robustness check. 21 The
qualitative results regarding the impact of housing prices remain unchanged, which
implies that it is not only specialized banks that are a￿ected by the developments
in the housing market, but also the rest of the banking system.
20The signi￿cance of the baseline hazard implies that a bank with an average CAMEL pro￿le is
signi￿cantly exposed to distress with a certain probability.
21Ideally, we would estimate PDs only for specialized banks, which was infeasible due to the small
group size. Also, we showed in Table 1 that 71 out of 75 specialized banks are located in the old
federal states, which implies that geographical coverage of specialized banks is not encompassing.
15Clearly, housing prices do not exhaust the list of potentially relevant state-speci￿c
factors in￿uencing bank stability. One important variable that might be relevant for
predicting bank PD at the state-level is the degree of economic activity as measured
by regional real GDP growth (Nuxoll et al., 2003). Economic growth can a￿ect bank
stability either directly (aggregate income, demand for new loans), or indirectly
(impact on housing prices). Similar to Nuxoll et al. (2003), real per capita GDP
growth does not have signi￿cant explanatory power. However, its inclusion eliminates
the signi￿cance of the interaction e￿ects with bank exposure proxies. Nevertheless,
the impact of price-to-rent ratios is still positive and signi￿cant, supporting the
importance of this variable as an indicator of real estate market risks for banks.
So far, we have used data on prices and rents of existing property, which consti-
tute the majority of the housing market in Germany. To cross-check the robustness
of our results regarding the type of the housing market considered, we re-estimate
the model with data on housing prices and rents of newly constructed property. The
estimation results yield an unchanged outcome, implying that the results do not
depend on the housing market under consideration.
4.4 PD predictions
While the estimation results show that (random) state-speci￿c e￿ects are important,
policy makers may be more interested in the implications of banks’ location on
their PDs. Therefore, we evaluate next the relative importance of both bank-speci￿c
CAMEL covariates and state-speci￿c real estate indices to predict bank PDs.
We compare probabilities of distress predicted with the multilevel mixed-e￿ect
speci￿cation without housing price e￿ects (Model 0) to predicted PDs from our
reference speci￿cation with housing price e￿ects (Model 4). The PDs are decomposed
into two parts: the bank-speci￿c e￿ect and the state-speci￿c random e￿ect ( uj). The
￿rst part measures the impact of standard bank-level covariates used in the literature
and is expected to constitute the largest part of the total PD. The second part is due
to the random variation across the German states as a result of the state-speci￿c
heterogeneity, which, in the case of Model 4, is not captured by the variation in
housing prices. In Figure 2 we present the dynamics of ￿xed and random parts of
predicted PDs over time for Models 0 and 4. The total PDs are grouped according
to the geographical location of the banks (old versus new states).
Several ￿ndings emerge from this picture. First, as expected, the ￿xed e￿ect part
of the total PD constitutes the largest part of the total PD in both speci￿cations.
Next, the impact of random e￿ects in both model speci￿cations is comparable, which
con￿rms our previous claim that there are other important state-speci￿c variables
not present in the model which explain a sizable potion of the state-speci￿c het-
erogeneity in terms of bank PDs. More importantly, the impact of state-speci￿c
heterogeneity is uniformly positive in the new federal states and negative in old
ones. Moreover, its impact is more than two times larger in the former regions. This
￿nding is valid also for other speci￿cations (not presented to conserve space) and
implies that banks located in the new states are more prone to distress due to the
state-speci￿c factors not captured by housing price(-to-rent) ￿uctuations. Thus, the
location of a bank is an important factor a￿ecting bank PDs even after controlling
for other conventional covariates.
16Figure 2: Predicted distress from Models 0 (without housing prices) and 4 (with
housing prices)
One caveat with interpreting this ￿nding is related to the fact that some of the
credit extended by banks to the new states originates from banks located in old
states. As shown previously in Table 1, only four out of 71 specialized mortgage
banks are located in new states, which means that it is likely that a signi￿cant
part of housing credit extended to these regions is recorded in the books of the
banks located outside the state. However, another important source for real estate
￿nancing in the new states may be regional saving and cooperative banks, which
are also very active in real estate lending. Separate regressions for these banking
groups yield qualitatively identical results between housing prices and banking risk.
To some extent, this supports the robustness of our previous conclusion. 22
5 Conclusion
This paper builds on the theoretical work relating individual bank stability to the
developments in regional real estate markets. We provide empirical evidence on this
relationship using German data on real estate prices per federal state and bank
data concerning ￿nancial accounts and distress events of both universal and spe-
cialized banks between 1995 and 2004. Since Germany’s real estate markets are
characterized by constantly declining prices during this period, we provide evidence
that complements other studies focusing on ￿nancial systems where housing prices
22However, we caution that we are ultimately unable to trace the particular region to which
bank loans are extended with certainty.
17exhibit exuberant hikes. Methodologically, we seek to contribute to the literature
by combining information at di￿erent aggregation levels, state (real estate) versus
bank level (￿nancial and distress), and use multilevel mixed-e￿ect logistic regression
methods to predict bank distress. Our main results are as follows.
In line with the prediction by Calomiris and Mason (2003), our empirical results
support the view that developments of real estate prices at the disaggregated (state)
level add signi￿cant discriminatory power to predict individual bank distress.
Real estate price levels per se have only a limited impact on bank distress.
Instead, price-to-rent ratios are both statistically and economically signi￿cant. Since
housing prices have declined constantly in Germany without any signs of a bubble,
this result suggests the general existence of a relation between bank distress and real
estate markets. To the extent that price-to-rent ratios re￿ect potentially exaggerated
expectations of investors regarding the present value of future cash ￿ows, we ￿nd
that especially such indicators of deviations from fundamental values are related
to higher bank PDs. Potentially, the relation between price-to-rent ratios and bank
distress might be even stronger in countries that have experienced booms and busts
in housing prices.
The exposure of a bank to the real estate market has implications for its sensitiv-
ity to housing price developments. After controlling for banking group membership
(universal versus specialized), increasing property prices decrease bank PDs, which
indicates risk reductions through the increase of collateral value. However, this e￿ect
is only signi￿cant for banks with relatively large exposure to mortgage lending. In
contrast, increasing price-to-rent ratios render all banks more vulnerable to distress,
albeit more specialized banks are a￿ected signi￿cantly stronger.
Housing prices do not exhaust the list of economic factors at the state level that
in￿uence bank distress. The random state-speci￿c variation of bank distress remains
signi￿cant and explains a relatively large part of the predicted bank PD. The impact
of state-speci￿c factors on PDs is uniformly positive for banks headquartered in the
new federal states. Hence, an economically signi￿cant part of bank PDs appears to
depend on factors outside the direct realm of managerial in￿uence, namely location.
In sum, price-to-rent ratios rather than housing price levels alone seem to contain
important information, especially if obvious signs of overheating are absent from
real estate markets. Even after controlling for other state-speci￿c e￿ects, this proxy
appears to provide useful information on potential hazards to bank stability. Note,
however, that the relatively low frequency of rent changes may constitute a potential
limitation of this proxy to fully capture changing expectations of future cash ￿ows.
18Appendix
A latent class cost frontier
We use stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to estimate cost functions and associated
ine￿ciency (CE). Banks k demand inputs x at prices w, and we also account for
equity z. In contrast to most studies, we assume that the transformation function
of the banking ￿rm can di￿er across J latent classes, T(y,x,z|j). Banks choose a
production plan that minimizes total operating cost ( TOC). Optimal costs depend
on the technology employed by the bank and deviations from optimal cost are either
due to random noise or ine￿ciency. Instead, of estimating (arbitrary) group-speci￿c
frontiers separately, we estimate latent production technologies of banks simultane-
ously. We follow Greene (2005) and specify a latent class frontier model as:
TOCkt = α + β
0
jxkt + kt|j, (5)
where xkt is a short-hand for the cost function arguments consisting of outputs
y, input prices w, control variables z, and the respective interaction terms of the
translog functional form. Coe￿cients β can vary across an a priori speci￿ed number
of groups j = 1,..,J and  is an error term composed of random noise vkt and
ine￿ciency ukt conditional on group j. Note that it is unknown into which group
individual banks k belong. Instead, we add an equation that represents the likelihood
of a bank to be classi￿ed into a certain group j conditional on it’s production
technology xkt as well as group speci￿c elasticities βj and e￿ciency parameters to




As in Greene (2005), we estimate bank-speci￿c probabilities of group membership








, for πJ = 0, (7)
where j = J is the reference group and zk are bank-speci￿c determinants of group













Parameters for equations (5) and (6) are obtained by estimating the joint likelihood
incorporating production and probability parameters (Greene, 2005). This allows us
to avoid the usual assumption of one identical frontier across banks and permits a
comparison of relative e￿ciency scores. We condition group membership on both a
specialization dummy based on the taxonomy of the Bundesbank and the share of
mortgage loans.23
23Descriptive statistics and parameter estimates are available upon request. For a more detailed
discussion of approaches to control for heterogeneity see Bos et al. (2008). More details on the
latent class frontier model are discussed in Koetter and Poghosyan (2008).
19ANOVA analysis of housing prices
We decompose housing price changes in Germany into two di￿erent levels, city
and state, to evaluate the importance of housing price variation across di￿erent
hierarchical levels by means of the explained variation. 24 If the variation across cities
within states is smaller than the variation across states, it is reasonable to aggregate
the city level information to the state level and base estimations on state-speci￿c
housing price indices. We employ data on housing prices collected for 125 German
cities by the Bulwien AG provided by the Bundesbank. 25 The structural form of the
multilevel model is given by:
∆logHPijt = γ0ij + εijt (9a)
γ0ij = γ00j + υ0ij (9b)
γ00j = γ000 + ζ0j (9c)
where HPijt is the price index for city i, in state j at time t, υ0ij ∼ N(0,συ) and
ζ0j ∼ N(0,σζ) are city- and state-level random error terms, and εijt ∼ N(0,σe) is
the i.i.d. residual. Equations (9a)-(9c) assume that average changes in price indices
vary across cities and states, as indicated by the subscripts of intercepts γ. The
reduced form is:26
∆logHPijt = γ000 + ζ0j + υ0ij + εijt (10)
An intuitive measure that summarizes the importance of shocks a￿ecting housing
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√
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=
σζ
σζ + συ + σε
= ρcity
(11)
The parameter ρi denotes the intraclass correlation at the city level. This coe￿cient
shows the expected level of correlation of log price di￿erences between two randomly
selected cities belonging to the same state. The larger ρi, the more clustered the
observations are within states and therefore more care needs to be taken to model
this intraclass dependence explicitly. Similarly, intraclass correlation on the state
level can be expressed as: ρstate = συ
σζ+συ+σε. Estimation results for speci￿cation (10)
using mixed e￿ect linear regression methods are summarized in Table 5.
The signi￿cant negative intercept coe￿cient means that on average German
housing prices declined. The variation of deviations across the total average varies at
di￿erent levels. Most of the variability originates from the state level ( σζ), while the
city-level variation within states is negligible and insigni￿cant (σ υ). This is also con-
￿rmed by the intraclass correlation coe￿cient, which is about 2% at the state level.
This can be interpreted as the expected correlation between two randomly chosen
price indices within the same state. The city-level intraclass correlation is zero. This
24See Jones and Bullen, 1994 for a similar application using urban house prices in the UK.
25We exclude Berlin, Hamburg and Saarland, since there is only a single price index.
26The residuals ζ0j, υ0ij and εijt nested at di￿erent levels are assumed to be uncorrelated.
20Table 5: ANOVA regression results for di￿erent housing price indices
γ000 σζ συ σε Intraclass correlation
state city
Housing prices -1.8376 0.6020 0.0012 3.8308 2.41% 0.00%
(st. err.) 0.2168 0.2025 0.1159 0.0823
Note: Estimations are performed using information on prices of houses per square meter for 122
German cities located in 13 German states for the 1995-2004 period. Berlin, Hamburg and Saarland
are excluded from estimations, since the dataset does not contain house price information on more
than one city in each of these states. Total number of observations is 1,230.
implies that the city-level variation averaged over states does not contribute to the
total variation. Thus, aggregation of housing price indices to the state-level would
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